Industrial Organization and Competition Policy
Coordinator: dr. E.I. Motchenkova
Lecturers: dr. E.I. Motchenkova
Fields: markets & organizations, micro
Evgenia Motchenkova is assistant professor in industrial organization. She received her PhD from Tilburg University. She is also research fellow at Tinbergen Institute and TILEC (Tilburg Law and Economics Center).
Her main research interests are: Industrial Organization, Law and Economics, Competition Policy and Regulation, Game Theory, Dynamic Games.
BSc: Promotion and Regulation of the Economy , Industrial Organization, Microeconomics
Msc: Industrial Organization and Competition Policy
PhD: Industrial Organization
Selected recent publications
Katsoulacos, Y., Motchenkova, E.I. & Ulph, D. (2015). Penalizing cartels: The case for basing penalties on price overcharge. International Journal of Industrial Organization, 42, 70-80.
Houba, H.E.D., Motchenkova, E.I. & Wen, Q. (2015). The Effects of Leniency on Cartel Pricing. The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, 15 (2), 351-389.
Lianos, I. & Motchenkova, E.I. (2013). Market Dominance and Search Quality in the Search Engine Market. Journal of Competition Law and Economics, 9 (2), 419-455.
Halbersma, R.S., Mikkers, M.C., Motchenkova, E.I. & Seinen, I. (2011). Market Structure and Hospital-Insurer Bargaining in the Netherlands. The European Journal of Health Economics, 12 (6), 589-603.
Motchenkova, E.I. (2008). Determination of optimal penalties for antitrust violations in a dynamic setting. European Journal of Operational Research, 189 (1), 269-291.
This course is designed to give students an overview of the mainstream theory of Industrial Organization.
After following this course, students
– can define and recognize main types and determinants of market structure
– can name and explain the determinants of the actions taken by firms and are able to explain the relationships between firms’ actions and market outcomes
– are able to apply mathematics, game theory, welfare analysis and micro-economic tools to analyze the problem of collusion, entry and exit decisions, vertical control, product differentiation, and adoption of new technologies issues
– can describe and analyze (both analytically and graphically) the main models used for analysis of strategic behavior of firms under asymmetric information
– are able to determine optimal firm and regulator behavior conditional on the type of market structure and nature of competition in the market and draw policy conclusions
Many markets of interest are dominated by only few firms. These firms not only choose their prices and outputs, but also the quality and design of their products, engage in advertising campaigns and make investments in R&D. They also decide on whether to enter or exit markets, whether to merge, vertically integrate, or to collude with rival firms. These choices have strong effects on the markets, in which firms operate, and may also have wider repercussions throughout the economy. This course presents an approach – based on strategic decision making – for understanding the functioning of such markets. We also use this approach to clarify the role of the government in regulating economic activity.
This course is designed to give students an overview of the mainstream theory of Industrial Organization, to provide students with insights in the organization of markets, and to give an overview of the main analytical tools used for analysis of imperfectly competitive markets. The course is primarily theoretical. At the same time, a number of empirical and experimental results will be discussed.
Part 1 of the course concerns non-strategic industrial organization and consists of the theory of the firm, analysis of monopoly power, price discrimination and vertical integration. Part 2 studies strategic industrial organization. The topics are static oligopoly models, dynamic price competition, spatial competition and advertising, incumbent/entrant behavior, R&D and adoption of new technologies. Also substantial attention will be devoted to applications of the IO tools for analysis of antitrust policy. There we will focus on European and US competition law, collusion, abuse of dominant position, and mergers.
Tirole, J. (1988), The Theory of Industrial Organization. MIT Press.
Motta, M. (2004), Competition Policy: Theory and Practice, Cambridge University Press.
Reader with articles provided on Black Board